Composable security analysis of continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution against coherent attacks. (arXiv:1802.02725v1 [quant-ph])

Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol, whose
security analysis does not rely on any assumption on the detection system, can
immune all the detection attacks. We give a first composable security analysis
for continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
using squeezed states against general coherent attacks. The security analysis
is derived based on the entanglement-based scheme considering finite size
effect. A version of state-independent entropic uncertainty relation is
exploited to give a lower bound on the conditional smooth min-entropy, thus the
security analysis does not rely on any assumption about the measured state. The
simulation results indicate that, in the universal composable security
framework, the protocol can tolerate 2.5 dB and 6.5 dB channel loss against
coherent attacks with direct and reverse reconciliation, respectively.

Article web page: